Good Faith in Canadian Trademark Applications by Vaver, David
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
10-2020 
Good Faith in Canadian Trademark Applications 
David Vaver 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, dvaver@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Source Publication: 
Submitted to Intellectual Property Journal (IPJ) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Vaver, David, "Good Faith in Canadian Trademark Applications" (2020). Articles & Book Chapters. 2813. 
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works/2813 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital 
Commons. 




Good Faith in Canadian Trademark Applications 
David Vaver* 
The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a 
nuisance to other people. – J.S. Mill, On Liberty (1869), ch 3 
 
On June 17, 2019, a new ground of trademark invalidation and opposition took 
effect in Canada: that “an application [for registration] was filed in bad faith.”1 
This cryptic provision was enacted in 2018 to modify the package of 2014 
amendments to the Trademarks Act that, when proclaimed into effect in 2019, 
radically changed Canada’s trademark system by allowing for the first time the 
registration of trademarks without evidence of use.2  
 This Comment explores why the bar on bad faith applications was enacted 
and how it may work in practice. 
 
1. RATIONALE 
After having its 2014 package of amendments enacted, the government realized 
that the resulting Act did not adequately prevent “cluttering and misuse” of 
 
* Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Emeritus 
Professor of Intellectual Property & Information Technology Law, University of Oxford. 
1 Trademarks Act, RSC 1985, c. T-13, ss. 38(2)(a.1) & 18(1)(e) [“Act”]. The words in square brackets 
appear in s. 18(1)(e) but not in s. 38(2)(a.1), where they are however clearly implied. 
2 Budget Implementation Act 2018 (No. 2), SC 2018, c. 227, ss. 218 & 219, adding to the Trademarks 
Act new paras. (e) to ss. 18(1) (invalidation) & (a.1) to s. 38(2) (opposition). For criticism of the initial 
2014 package of amendments, see D. Bereskin, “Canada’s Ill-Conceived New ‘Trademark’ Law: A 
Venture into Constitutional Quicksand” 104 Trademark Reporter 1112 (2014); B. Amani & C. Craig, 
“The ‘Jus’ of Use: Trademarks in Transition” (2018) 30 IPJ 217. 




registrations.3 The lacuna had been spotted by a foreign applicant who had 
been operating for some time globally behind a plethora of companies. Starting 
in 2017, he or his nominees filed over 400 applications in Canada for famous 
marks and common words and names covering every conceivable business 
activity, i.e., the entire 45 Nice classes of goods and services.4 Whether any of 
these marks were ever in use was doubtful, but in any event an intention to use 
the entire portfolio in any sort of honest trade could hardly be claimed 
realistically.  
 The bar on bad faith applications enacted in 2018 effectively blocks this kind 
of abuse. It applies retrospectively to applications advertised from June 17, 
2019 – which can then be opposed – and to registrations made from that date, 
which can be the subject of invalidation proceedings brought in the Federal 
Court by any interested person.5 Oddly, however, examiners cannot raise bad 
faith directly during prosecution,6 although they may perhaps be able to do so 
indirectly by querying the truthfulness of any application claiming too broad a 
 
3 See ISED, Intellectual Property Strategy (Apr. 26, 2018), online at 
www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/108.nsf/eng/h_00000.html.  
4 Brandster Branding Ltd filed 433 applications between 2017 and 2020. The individual behind 
Brandster is no stranger to trademark litigation abroad. His behaviour has caused much adverse 
judicial comment: see, e.g., Re CKL Holdings NV’s TM App’n, Case No O/036/18 (Dec. 18, 2017) at [5] 
(UK Appointed Person) [CKL Holdings]; Trump Int’l Ltd v DTTM Operations LLC, [2019] EWHC 769 at 
[52]-[4] & passim (Ch) [Trump]; Fashion One (Europe) NV’s TM Registration, O/146/20 (UKTMO, Mar. 
9, 2020), at [50]-[3]; Fashion TV Brand Holdings CV v CBM Creative Brands Marken GmbH, R 
2445/2017-G (EUIPO Grand Bd App, Feb. 11, 2020). 
5 Act, ss. 72 & 73 (invalidation) & s. 2 (def. “person interested”); s. 68.2 (opposition); see too Baker 
Petrolite Corp v. Canwell Enviro-Industries Ltd, 2002 FCA 158 at [17]-[23] & [27], on retrospectivity. 
The applications by Brandster Branding Ltd and other like applications filed by companies associated 
with the individual behind Brandster have mostly now been abandoned. 
6 Ibid, s. 30(2). 




range of goods or services for which a mark “is used or proposed to be used.”7 
 The new bar is no doubt inspired by the similar provisions found in EU and 
UK trademark law8 and also by comparable provisions found in domain name 
registry rules.9 The bar vindicates the fundamental legal and moral principle 
that nobody should benefit from their wrong,10 which, as applied to 
trademarks, may be defined as attempting to use registration as a means to gain 
rights “in an improper manner or for an improper purpose.”11 Not only may 
cases such as that of the 400-application filer be caught; so too may less 
egregious abuses where applicants seek unfairly to interfere with the interests 
of others instead of merely advancing their own trading interests legitimately. 
Abusive applications may include those filed with one or more of the following 
 
7 Ibid, s. 37(1)(a), raising s. 30(2)(a), entitling refusal of an application where the Registrar is satisfied 
that the application “does not conform” to requirements such as properly specifying goods and 
services for which the applicant intends to use the mark. Applications that cover wide classes of 
goods may thus be rejected where an applicant cannot possibly deal with them all honestly and can 
give no satisfactory explanation for their inclusion or extent: see, e.g., Cerverceria Modelo, SA de CV v 
Marcon, 2008 CanLII 88189 (TMOB) [Cerverceria]. 
8 Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, art. 4(2); compare Trade Marks 
Act 1994 (UK), s. 3(6) (“A trade mark shall not be registered if or to the extent that the application is 
made in bad faith”). The Directive lacks the italicized words in the UK Act but has nonetheless been 
interpreted the same way: Sky plc v Skykick UK Ltd, [2020] EUECJ C-371/18 at [81] (Eur Ct J) [Sky I]. 
9 See CIRA Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Version 1.3, Aug. 22, 2011) at [3.5], providing 
examples of bad faith; online at www.cira.ca/assets/Documents/Legal/Dispute/CDRPpolicy1_3.pdf;  
http://www.cira.ca/assets/Documents/Legal/Dispute/CDRPrules1_4.pdf [CIRA DRP]. 
10 H. Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims, 5th ed. (1870), 279 (a legal maxim “based on elementary 
principles … fully recognized in courts of law and of equity, [which] admits of illustration from every 
branch of legal procedure”); Sec’y of State for Communities & Local Government v Welwyn Hatfield BC, 
[2011] UKSC 15 at [45]-[56] (deliberately false application for planning permission invalid); similarly 
in Canada, Bank of Montreal v Ng [1989] 2 SCR 429, 441 (“fundamental moral precept”). 
11 CKL Holdings, above note 4 at [21]  




purposes in mind:12 
• to block an undertaking’s likely expansion; 
• to retaliate against it or otherwise disrupt its business;  
• to trade off the reputation of a locally well-known mark that may 
however be used only abroad;  
• to take unfair advantage of a prior relationship or prior dealings with an 
affected mark owner or earlier user; 
• to stockpile a mark or marks for future possible use;  
• to prolong the life of an unused mark in danger of being expunged for 
non-use;  
• to create “rights” to milk for their nuisance or negotiating value. 
As we shall see, it is easier to list the sort of conduct that seems to offend notions 
of good faith than to articulate why it does so. The following Sections consider 
the tests that may be used to decide when bad faith should be found.  
  
2. BACKGROUND 
 A concept of bad faith has historically been more prominent in UK than 
Canadian trademark law. It first arose in Victorian England as a reason to cancel 
or amend a registration based on an application filed for an unused mark in 
respect of which the applicant had no definite intention to use for the class of 
goods sought. Although nothing in the UK trademarks legislation specifically 
required applications to be made in good faith, the courts readily implied that 
 
12 See, e.g., in the UK and EU, the cases referred to in N. Dawson, “Bad faith in European trade mark 
law” [2011] IPQ 229; J. Phillips, Trade Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy (Oxford: OUP, 2003) at 
[13.79]ff. See Section 5 below, “Examples”. 




condition into the Act. As it was put in 1898 in Re J. Batt & Co.’s Trade Marks:13  
I take it to be clear that if persons register new Trade Marks which they say they 
intend to use, they must, at the date of registration, have a bona fide intention of using 
those Trade Marks in respect of the goods for which they register them. … Indeed, one 
cannot help seeing the evils that may result from allowing Trade Marks to be 
registered [with] no real intention of using them, or only an intention possibly of 
using them in respect of a few articles. The inconvenience it occasions, and the costs 
it occasions, are very large, and ... would lead, in some cases, to absolute oppression, 
and to persons using the position they have as registered owners of Trade Marks, 
which are not really bona fide Trade Marks, for the purpose of trafficking in them, and 
using them as a weapon to obtain money from subsequent persons who may want to 
use bona fide Trade Marks in respect of some classes, in respect of which they find 
these bogus Trade Marks registered. … Indeed, … a system of trafficking appears to 
be carried on at the present day. 
 The Supreme Court of Canada followed Batt’s case in the early 20th century 
for registrations where the applicant lacked a definite intention to use the mark, 
although without employing the language of good or bad faith.14 Under the 
1953 Trade Marks Act, the Registrar of Trademarks however started cautiously 
using the language of bad faith in rejecting applications where an applicant’s 
required statement that it was “satisfied” of its entitlement to use a mark could 
not possibly be true. If evidence showed that an applicant did not or could not 
really intend to use the mark applied for or was for other reasons barred from 
using it lawfully, the application was rejected during prosecution or opposition 
as fatally defective for including a statement of entitlement that must have been 
 
13 (1898) 15 RPC 262, 266 (Ch) per Romer J, aff’d ibid (1898) at 534 (CA), aff’d [1899] AC 428 (HL). 
14 Pugsley, Dingman & Co Ltd v Proctor & Gamble Co [1929] SCR 442, 448; Lightning Fastener Co Ltd v 
Canadian Goodrich Co Ltd [1932] SCR 189, 199. 




made in bad faith.15 
  
3. BAD FAITH DESCRIBED 
 The new amendments contained various new definitions and redefinitions 
but, curiously, none on bad faith. True, the comparable ground in the UK Act is 
equally undefined and British judges have said bad faith has “numerous 
manifestations and cannot be classified comprehensively:”16 the term 
comprises “chameleon words [that] take their content and their colour from 
their surroundings.”17 A definition could nevertheless have reduced potential 
areas of controversy. Thus the federal Bills of Exchange Act and many provincial 
sale of goods statutes based on late 19th century UK law define a good faith act 
for their purposes as something “in fact done honestly, whether it is done 
negligently or not.”18 By contrast, the more recent American Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”) defines good faith as “honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”19 This 
progressive expansion of meaning is also reflected in dictionary definitions. 
One defines bad faith as “treachery; intent to deceive,”20 another more broadly 
 
15 Act, above note 1, s. 30(i), repealed; see, e.g., Cerverceria, above note 7, citing Sapodilla Co Ltd v 
Bristol Myers Co (1974), 15 CPR (2d) 152, 155 (Reg. TM). 
 
16 Trump, above note 4 at [85](iv). 
17 Harrison’s TM App’n (CHINAWHITE), [2004] FSR 13 at [14] (Pat Ct), aff’d Harrison v Teton Valley 
Trading Co, [2004] EWCA Civ 1028 [Harrison]. 
18 Bills of Exchange Act, RSC 1985, c. B-4, s. 3; see also, e.g., Sale of Goods Act, RSO 1990, c. S.1, s. 2(3). 
19 UCC, § 1-201(20). 
20 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th ed (2002), 916, 




as “dishonest or unacceptable behaviour.”21 It does not help that the phrase, if 
undefined, may mean one thing in one part of a statute and something else in 
another part, as was pointed out in respect of the current UK Trade Marks Act.22  
 The Trademarks Opposition Board and ultimately the courts will have to 
develop a definition of bad faith by asking what the “content and colour” of bad 
faith is in the context of filing a trademark application, and what constitutes use 
of the trademark system “in an improper manner or for an improper 
purpose.”23 Pre-2019 Board decisions may be helpful in indicating instances of 
such improper filings, although no comprehensive  definition of bad faith was 
ever attempted. Those responsible for the introduction of the new bad faith bar 
presumably expected decision-makers to draw from a number of other relevant 
sources. These may include the following: 
• Canadian copyright law. This includes a reference to “bad faith” among 
the factors to be considered in assessing statutory damages for 
infringement. Bad faith there has been equated with “conduct that is 
contrary to community standards of honesty, reasonableness or 
fairness.”24  
• Quebec law. Concepts of good and bad faith are well established in the law 
of Quebec, where the Civil Code requires all civil rights to be exercised “in 
 
21 Cambridge Dictionary def. at dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/bad-faith; last accessed 
Oct. 2, 2020. 
22 Harrison, above note 17 at [14] (Pat Ct). The scatterings of “good faith” and “bona fide” throughout 
the Canadian Act may similarly not carry the same meaning, nor even a meaning opposite to that of 
“bad faith” as that term is used in relation to the filing of an application. 
23 Re CKL Holdings, above note 4 at [21]. 
24 Century 21 Canada LP v Rogers Communications Inc 2011 BCSC 1196 at [408] on s. 38.1(5)(a) of the 
Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c. C-42. 




accordance with the requirements of good faith.”25 The concept of bad 
faith – i.e., a lack of good faith – has over time developed to extend beyond 
dishonesty and malice to include intent to injure and, as the Civil Code 
puts it, the exercise of one’s rights “in an excessive or unreasonable 
manner.”26 This last standard, applied to trademark applicants, would 
require them not to abuse their right of application and instead file the 
way a normally prudent and reasonable person would, viz., “in a spirit of 
fair play.”27  
• EU and UK trademark law. Bad faith there requires the invalidation of 
registrations based on applications that have been filed either 
dishonestly or “unacceptably,” in the sense of falling below reasonable 
standards of fair dealing. This language sounds much like the standard of 
excessiveness or unreasonableness mentioned in the law of Quebec.  
 The considerable jurisprudence on the EU and UK standards deserves close 
examination, particularly because of the similarity between the EU and UK 
legislation and the Canadian provision. One may expect Canadian cases on bad 
faith to come out much the same as those in comparable EU and UK cases – but 
not always. Quite apart from where an EU or UK case is wrongly decided, one 
may expect some different results and reasoning because of significant 
differences in detail between Canada’s Trademarks Act and EU and UK 
 
25 Civil Code of Quebec, c. CCQ-1991, art. 6 [CCQ]. 
26 Ibid, art. 7; see also Houle v Canadian National Bank [1990] 3 SCR 122, 136ff, describing the 
historical development of abuse of rights and bad faith [Houle]. 
27 Houle, ibid at 152 & 158; Bhasin v Hrynew 2014 SCC 71 at [83] (contractual duty) [Bhasin]; see too 
TV Guide c Publications La Semaine Inc (1984) 6 CIPR 110 at 122 & 127 (Que CS) [TV Guide], 
where “spiking a competitor’s guns” a few days before its announced product launch was the 
employment of means that were contrary to honest practice (“des moyens contraires aux 
honnêtes usages”). 
 




trademarks legislation. Also, as with fair dealing in the law of copyright, issues 
of fair play are very fact-dependent — a “question of degree” and “matter of 
impression”28 ultimately “grounded in social and moral values.”29  Such values 
may well vary over time and place.  
 It is nevertheless useful – as Quebec, the EU and the UK all do – to divide our 
discussion of bad faith initially into “dishonest” and “unacceptable” conduct and 
consider how such standards may operate in Canadian law. 
  
(a) Dishonest Conduct  
 To assess a trademark applicant’s conduct, EU and UK courts typically first 
ask whether the filing was subjectively dishonest – the narrow dictionary 
definition of “bad faith.” Two further questions then arise: (i) when filing, what 
did the applicant subjectively know, believe, and intend in fact, including what 
they chose to be wilfully or recklessly blind to;30 (ii) with that state of mind, 
would their conduct in filing be considered dishonest by ordinary decent 
people?31 If so, the applicant filed in bad faith. If no, one goes on to consider the 
“unacceptable conduct” branch of bad faith: did the applicant’s conduct in filing 
fall short of acceptable commercial behaviour observed by reasonable and 
 
28 Hubbard v Vosper, [1972] 2 QB 84 at 94 (CA), cited with approval in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law 
Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 339 at [52]. 
 
29 Miller v Miller [2006] 2 AC 618 at [14] (HL). 
30 Compare Caja Paraguaya de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Personal de Itaipu Binacional v Garcia 2020 
ONCA 412 at [34]-[7]. 
31 Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd (t/a Crockfords) [2017] UKSC 67 at [74]; similarly R v Théroux 
[1993] 2 SCR 5 at [22]. 




experienced people in that field?32 Dishonest behaviour will of course always 
be unacceptable,33 but not all unacceptable behaviour is dishonest: passing-off 
or breach of a legal or moral duty are obvious examples.34  
 In proceeding this way, however, EU and UK courts seemingly divide bad faith 
into two separate but equal components: (a) dishonesty and (b) unacceptable 
conduct. One might, perhaps more logically, reverse the order of these concepts 
and treat bad faith as (a) unacceptable conduct, and (b) dishonesty as a species 
of such conduct. Doing so may shift the focus away from always having to probe 
an applicant’s subjective intent: one would instead first consider the applicant’s 
conduct objectively. The result may reduce the costs of the inquiry, for if an 
applicant’s conduct is objectively unacceptable, dishonesty should matter only 
where elevated costs are sought.35 One particular trap into which EU and UK 
courts have fallen may also be avoided: that of injecting dishonest intent into 
the concept of unacceptable conduct – a question to which we now turn. 
 
(b) Unacceptable conduct 
 An issue to consider in deciding whether an applicant has acted unacceptably 
is the state of their knowledge. Should acceptability be judged objectively, 
according to what the applicant ought, acting reasonably, to have known or 
believed? Or should it be judged subjectively, according to what the applicant 
 
32 Maslyukov v Diageo Distilling Ltd [2010] EWHC 443 at [36]-[7] & [43] (Ch) [Maslyukov]; see too 
UCC § 2-103(b): “’Good faith’ in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade” (emphasis added). 
33 See, e.g., Sky I, above note 12 at [74] & [77]. 
34 Hotel Cipriani SRL v Cipriani (Grosvenor Street) Ltd [2008] EWHC 3032 at [186] & [192] (Ch), aff’d 
[2010] EWCA Civ 110 [Cipriani]. 
35 HomeAway.com Inc v Hrdlicka 2012 FC 1467 at [37] [HomeAway.com].  




actually knew or believed? American commentary on good faith under the UCC 
puts the point picturesquely by asking whether good faith should be found if 
the heart is pure and (or perhaps because) the head is empty.36  
 In struggling with such questions, EU tribunals have, somewhat confusingly, 
created a hybrid subjective/objective test: an applicant’s conduct should be 
judged objectively, but only against what the applicant knew or must be taken 
to have known. Subjective intention should thus be assessed “by reference to 
the objective circumstances of the particular case.”37 
 This way of stating matters can be seen in the leading English Court of Appeal 
decision in Harrison v Teton Valley Trading Co in 2004.38 The court started off 
by firmly rejecting the “pure heart” approach: if dishonesty were the test of bad 
faith, “then that word would have been used.”39 The court then went on to say 
that the applicant’s knowledge would include what he “ought to have known 
[according to] persons adopting proper standards.”40 But that apparently 
objective test suddenly took a subjective turn. Even though the court had just 
distinguished dishonesty from bad faith, it circled back to discuss what 
dishonesty meant. Two of the three judges concluded that “the words ‘bad faith’ 
required consideration of the mental state of the applicant.” The third judge, 
although concurring in finding bad faith, thought that “reprehensible” conduct, 
not “conscious dishonesty”, sufficed: for her, an applicant, though pure of heart, 
 
36 M. Moses, “The New Definition of Good Faith in Revised Article 1” 35 UCC LJ 47, 48, speaking of the 
test once adopted under UCC § 1-201(20). 
37 Malaysia Dairy Industries Pte. Ltd v Ankenavnet for Patenter og Varemarker [2013] EUECJ C-320/12 
at [36] (ECJ). 
38 Above note 17. 
39 Harrison, ibid (EWCA) at [20]. 
40 Ibid at [27]. 




might nevertheless act in bad faith.41 
 The case was not further appealed but the majority’s reasoning was 
immediately criticized as illogical by a lower tribunal, which nevertheless felt 
bound to follow it as best it could.42 The majority view came to be taken up by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which, however, curiously justified its 
reasoning partly by claiming that the “usual meaning in everyday language” of 
bad faith presupposes “a dishonest state of mind or intention.”43 The objection 
that had dishonesty been intended, “that word would have been used,” was 
simply ignored. UK courts, being bound by the ECJ on such matters, 
diplomatically said nothing more about the “usual” meaning of a common 
English word and followed the ECJ line.44 
 What of Canadian law? Should the unacceptable conduct limb of bad faith be 
interpreted subjectively, objectively, or according to some hybrid 
subjective/objective test?  The following considerations suggest that a fully 
objective test is preferable: 
• One purpose of the bar on bad faith applications is to protect the public 
and other right-holders and users of trademarks against the effects of 
abuse of the registration system. Those effects depend on the objective 
facts of a case, whatever the applicant’s knowledge or intent.  
 
41 Ibid at [32] & [46], discussing Re DAAWAT Trade Mark [2003] RPC 187 at [96] (UK App Person); 
compare Harrison, ibid at [41] per Arden LJ (now Lady Arden, UKSC), dissenting on this point. 
42 “I do not find this exposition of the law easy to understand”: Re Robert McBride Ltd’s TM App’n, Case 
No O-355-04 (Nov. 22 2004, UK App Person) at [27]ff, per Arnold QC (now LJ) pointing out its 
inconsistencies. 
43 Sky I, above note 12 at [74]. 
44 Walton Int’l Ltd v Verweij Fashion BV [2018] EWHC 1608 at [186](vi) (Ch), per Arnold J. EU 
tribunals continue to make heavy weather of the relationship between actual and constructive 
knowledge: e.g., Cuervo y Sobrinos 1882 v EUIPO [2018] EUECJ T-374/17 at [53]-[9] (ECJ). 




• A further purpose of the bar must be to promote good practice by 
trademark applicants, such as, before filing, taking competent 
professional advice and conducting competent searches for potential 
conflicting interests.45 Failing to do either suggests behaviour that does 
not occur “in a spirit of fair play:” it falls below the standards expected of 
a normally prudent and reasonable person, whether they be in trade or 
not. That standard fits comfortably with the concept of objective bad faith 
as understood in Quebec law, where acts done “in an excessive or 
unreasonable manner” are stigmatized.46 
• A purely objective test also gains support from the pragmatic 
consideration that “[t]he less legal rights depend on someone’s state of 
mind, the better”47 – for “even the Devil has not knowledge of man's 
thoughts.”48 Such considerations underlie much of Canadian civil law, 
including that of trademarks. Thus, subjective knowledge or intention is 
irrelevant in proving confusion when considering title, registrability, or 
infringement; nor is knowledge or intent required to establish passing-
 
45 Redd Solicitors LLP v Red Legal Ltd [2012] EWPCC 54 (Pat Co Ct), holding that a failure to undertake 
a competent trademark search is contrary to “honest practices in industrial and commercial matters,” 
thus eliminating a defence to infringement under what are now arts. 14.1(a) & 14.2 of the Regulation 
(EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union 
trade mark. 
46 CCQ, above note 25, arts. 6 & 7; Houle, above note 26 at 152 & 158. 
47 Mercoid Corp v Mid-Continent Investment Co 320 US 661, 680 (1944), dissent (patent); Spin Master 
Ltd v PMS Int’l Group [2017] EWHC 1477 at [8] (Pat Ct) (industrial design). See too under pre-2019 
Canadian law, Taste of BC Fine Foods Ltd v Au-Yueng 2013 TMOB 192 at [29]-[30] & [35] (trademark 
opposition succeeds because licensee’s statement of entitlement was, while not in “bad faith,” not 
“appropriate” or “reasonable”). 
48 Year Book, 17 Edw. 4, Pasch. 2 (1477), approved in Krys v Krys [1929] SCR 153, 165; Goodfriend v 
Goodfriend [1972] SCR 640, 652. 




off under the Act, common law, or the law of delict.49 
• EU tribunals have sometimes treated bad faith as “not substantially 
different” from the requirement in the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property that traders not act “contrary to honest practices in 
industrial or commercial matters.”50 They have, however, not fully 
assimilated the consequences of this view into their understanding of bad 
faith. The Convention imposes “a duty to act fairly” – not merely honestly 
– having regard to the legitimate interests of right-holders.51 The focus is 
on the honesty of the practice rather than the practitioner.52 
• An objective test promotes certainty by making it easier to hold 
particular sorts of conduct abusive, while simultaneously leaving room 
to include other conduct where an applicant has been found to have acted 
dishonestly. 
 
4. GUIDELINES  
 Some of the following guidelines drawn, as seems useful, from Canadian, EU, 
and UK practice, may assist in deciding issues of bad faith:53 
 
49 Mattel, Inc v 3894207 Canada Inc [2006] 1 SCR 772 at [90] [Mattel]. 
50 J. Choo Ltd v Soochi Ltd, Case No R633/2007-2 (OHIM 2nd Bd Appeal, Feb. 29, 2008) at [24], referring 
to art. 10bis(2) of the Paris Convention (Brussels rev 1934), at ww.wipo.int/treaties/en/; see too N. 
Dawson, above note 12 at 248 (bad faith is an “inbuilt unfair competition rule”). 
51 Maier v Asos Plc, [2015] EWCA Civ 220 at [147]. 
52 A point equally made in S & S Industries v Rowell [1966] SCR 419, 425ff when considering s. 7(a) of 
the Act proscribing injurious falsehood. Subsection 7(a) implements art. 10bis(3)(2) of the Paris 
Convention, above note 48, which is a specific instance of the general Convention duty to act according 
to honest practices (art. 10bis(2)). The court distinguished s. 7(a) from injurious falsehood at 
common law: the latter requires some form of malice, the former does not. 
53 Compare Red Bull GmbH v Sun Mark Ltd [2012] EWHC 1929 at [130]-[8] (Ch); [Red Bull]; Phillips, 
above note 12 at [13.79]ff; Dawson, above note 12, 247-8. 




• Bad faith as an independent ground of opposition or invalidation should 
be clearly pleaded and particularized. It may succeed even if another 
ground would not. Thus an application may be rejected for bad faith even 
if no confusion exists between the applicant’s and opponent’s 
trademarks.54 
• Bad faith is not presumed: it must be proved on a balance of probabilities 
on evidence that is sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent.55 
Circumstantial evidence and inferences from proved facts may suffice;56 
hearsay and conjecture will not.57 
• The following questions may be put: (a) what specifically was the 
applicant’s objective in filing; (b) is that something for which an 
application could properly be filed; (c) was the application in fact filed to 
pursue that objective?58  
• The whole picture surrounding the filing of the application should be 
considered, including the kind of mark applied for and how far registration 
and use may harm other traders. For example, bad faith may be found 
more easily where the mark comprises a product shape already used by 
others, where the registration may well be used to harass legitimate 
competitors.59 
 
54 Cipriani, above note 34 (EWHC) at [186]. 
55 F.H. v McDougall 2008 SCC 53 at [40] & [45]-[6].  
56 Compare Beijing Jingdong 360 Du E-Commerce Ltd v Zhang 2019 FC 1293 at [23]-[4] [Beijing 
Jingdong]. 
57 Domaines Pinnacle Inc v Les Vergers de la Colline 2016 FC 188 at [68], aff’d 2016 FCA 302. 
58 Re Robot Energy Ltd’s Trade Mark App’n, Case No O/308/20 (Jun. 2, 2020) at [57] (UK App Person). 
59 Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprungli v Franz Hauswirth GmBh [2009] EUECJ C-529/07 at [50] (ECJ). 




• While bad faith is assessed as at the date of filing, later evidence may be 
relevant.60 For example, a plea of bad faith that fails in opposition may 
succeed in invalidation proceedings because post-registration evidence 
may clarify the real reason for the application. 
• Neither the complainant’s motives nor the applicant’s overall commercial 
morality are, however, relevant: the inquiry cannot “veer into a form of ad 
hoc judicial moralism.”61 
• The conduct of any entities associated with the applicant may be relevant, 
especially where the applicant is really their agent, nominee, or affiliate. 
• Other applications for registration or expungement in Canada or abroad 
by any associated entity may thus be considered.62 
• Bad faith may exist in respect of only part of the application: that part may 
be excised and the remainder will stay valid. Thus a filing for computers 
and beer where the intention is to market computers now but beer only in 
the indeterminate future is valid for computers but may be struck for 
beer.63 The assertion that bad faith is incurable64 therefore must apply 
only to applications or registrations that cannot be amended to drop the 
offending part. 
• A decision on bad faith involves a question of mixed fact and law and so 
 
60 Pentastar Transport Ltd v FCA US LLC 2020 FC 367 at [45]-[50] [Pentastar]; Red Bull, above note 53 
at [131]-[2]. 
61 Bhasin, above note 27 at [70]; see also Maslyukov, above note 32 at [43]. 
62 Trump, above note 4 at [39]-[43] & [46]. 
63 Sky I, above note 12 at [81]; Sky Plc v Skykick UK Ltd [2020] EWHC 990 (Ch) [Sky II]; Roots Corp v 
YM Inc (Sales) 2019 FC 16 at [67]-[71]. 
64 Maslyukov, above note 32 at [50]. An action for passing-off may however succeed despite an invalid 
registration. 




deserves deference on appeal if no extricable error of law is present.65 
 
5. EXAMPLES 
 The kind of applications that may be considered as filed in bad faith has 
already been indicated above in Section 1. In all of them, the applicant’s 
behaviour in filing the application was inconsistent with that expected of a 
normally prudent and reasonable person wishing to engage with the trademark 
system. That system expects applicants to seek registration to further their own 
legitimate trading interests, not to achieve purposes such as:  
• blocking another undertaking’s likely expansion; 
• retaliating against it or otherwise disrupt its business;  
• trading off the reputation of a locally well-known mark that may 
however be used only abroad; 
• taking unfair advantage of a prior relationship or prior dealings with an 
affected mark owner or earlier user; 
• stockpiling a mark for future possible use;  
• prolonging the life of an unused mark in danger of being expunged for 
non-use; or 
• creating “rights” to milk for their nuisance or negotiating value.66  
 As indicated, such manoeuvring is not unknown in Canada. Take, for example, 
the case of the applicant who sought to register a slew of famous marks for 
alcohol — ABSOLUT, HEINEKEN, CANADIAN CLUB, COORS, DOM PÉRIGNON, etc — and claim 
 
65 E.g., Pentastar, above note 60 at [61]ff.  
66 E.g., HomeAway.com, above note 35 at [37]; Melly’s TM App’n (fiann fail & fine gael Trade Marks) 
[2008] RPC 454 (UK App Person); Paris Convention, above note 50, art. 6bis(3). See further text below 
accompanying notes 75ff. 




them for non-alcoholic products. The affected companies all opposed 
registration and, unsurprisingly, all won.67 Such an application could today be 
straightforwardly rejected for bad faith. So should applications for multiple 
marks across multiple classes of goods and services where the applicant could 
not possibly run a legitimate business over the whole range.68 So should 
applications for even a single mark over multiple disparate classes be rejected 
where the applicant intends to do business in only a few. Putting a cordon 
sanitaire round a mark to deter traders from marketing products remote from 
the registrant’s business was treated as bad faith in the UK, and the registration 
was trimmed accordingly.69 On the other hand, it is not necessarily bad faith for 
a concurrent user to apply for registration even where it knows of other users: 
which of them, if any, is ultimately entitled to registration may be doubtful at 
time of filing and the case thus may be better decided on grounds other than 
bad faith.70  
 An allegation of bad faith may – as in Batt’s case above71 – charge that an 
applicant lacks any genuine intent to use the mark now or soon or lacks title to 
use it.72 This engages the statutory requirement in subsection 30(1) of the Act 
that applicants “propose” to use a trademark, in the sense of their having “a 
resolved or settled purpose” to use it held at the time of application – not “a 
 
67 Cerverceria, above note 7; see also Brown-Forman Corp v Marcon 2013 TMOB 191. 
68 E.g., the Brandster Branding Ltd issue: see notes 4 & 5 above. 
69 Sky I, above note 12 at [81]; Sky II, above note 63. 
70 Cipriani, above note 34 (EWHC) at [192]; Starfire Publishing Ltd v Ordo Templi Orientis [2009] RPC 
437 at [122]-[6] (UK App Person). 
71 Above note 13. 
72 See Act, s. 30(1). 




mere problematical intention [or] uncertain or indeterminate possibility.”73 
 The other statutory requirement in subsection 30(1), that of applicants’ being 
“entitled” to use the mark, should bar applications where:  
(i) another person owns the mark or is an earlier user in Canada; 
(ii) the mark is well known in Canada, albeit through third party use 
abroad; 
(iii) the mark’s use would violate a statute or regulation, or  
(iv) its use could be stopped by an injunction for, e.g., passing-off, 
commercial appropriation of personality, or violation of an 
intellectual property right. 
 The 2019 amendments do not suggest any intention to reverse the 
Opposition Board’s practice of rejecting applications in such cases where an 
entitlement to use a mark could not reasonably, appropriately, or honestly be 
claimed.74 Nor, on the other hand, is any intention indicated of interfering with 
the common Canadian (and indeed worldwide) practice whereby different 
traders adopt the same mark in different territories or for different goods or 
services, so long as the public would not likely believe that the same trader 
vouched for both products or was connected with the other trader. For 
example: 
• A may apply for BLOBBY for refrigerators, knowing it is used for them by 
M in Mexico but unused and little known in Canada. A’s registration may 
 
73 Re Ducker’s Trade Mark (1928) 45 RPC 397, 402 (CA). Similarly in a non-trademark context, it was 
held that an intention to do something “connotes a state of affairs which [a person] decides, so far as 
in him lies, to bring about, and which, in point of possibility, he has a reasonable prospect of being 
able to bring about, by his own act of volition”: Betty’s Cafés Ltd v Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd [1959] 
AC 20, 34 (HL) (“intention” is here the same as “proposing” (ibid, 49)). 
74 See generally, D. Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks, 2nd ed. (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2011), 450-2. 




later legitimately stop M’s expansion into Canada under that mark. 
Foreign priority does not by itself prevent local registration by others.75 
• A cannot however apply for BLOBBY if the mark is unused but sufficiently 
known in Canada – even if not technically “well known”76 – so that 
potential refrigerator buyers in some part of Canada would likely believe 
that BLOBBY designates M or someone licensed by M.77 
• Within Canada BLOBBY can similarly be used by A for refrigerators and 
later used and registered by Q for boots. Consumers would likely not be 
confused: they would think A’s expansion into boots “a leap too far.”78 
 Additional facts could change this last scenario. Assume, for example, that Q 
uses WIGGLY for its boots but applies to register BLOBBY for boots after one of the 
following events happens: 
• A tweets that it is planning to expand into boots.79 
 
75 Santa Barbara Restaurant Group, Inc v Veto 2014 TMOB 286 at [31]-[3]; USA PRO IP Ltd v Courtaulds 
Textiles America, Inc 2018 TMOB 90 at [21]-[3] [USA PRO]. Similarly in the US, Person’s Co Ltd v 
Christman 900 F 2d 1565 (Fed Cir 1990); but see Belmore LLC v Bayer Consumer Care AG 819 F 3d 
697 (4th Cir 2016), cert den 137 S Ct 1202 (2017) (passing-off claim possible). 
76 Act, above note 1, s. 5; Paris Convention, above note 50, art. 6bis(3).  
77 AJIT WEEKLY TM, [2006] RPC 633 (UK App Person); compare the ongoing Canadian saga over the AJIT 
trademark: Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust v Navsun Holdings Ltd, 2018 FC 42 at [19], aff’d 2019 FCA 10, 
leave to appeal dismissed 2019 CanLII 62558 (SCC); Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust v Navsun Holdings 
Ltd, 2019 FCA 295; also Homeaway.com, above note 35 at [37]. 
78 Mattel, above note 49 at [8]. 
 
79 Compare TV Guide, above note 27 (similar conduct by Q held unfair competition); Reckitt Benckiser 
LLC v Jamieson Laboratories Ltd, 2015 FC 215 at [42] & [46], aff’d  2015 FCA 104 (pre-trial injunction 
granted: intent relevant to equitable discretion); Glaxo Plc v Glaxowellcome Ltd,[1996] FSR 388 (Ch) 
[Glaxo] (pre-trial injunction granted); Gaines Animal Foods Ltd’s TM App’n [1958] RPC 312 (UK TMO) 
(application rejected in TMO’s discretion). 




• A applies to extend BLOBBY’s registration to boots but withdraws its 
application because it puts boot expansion on hold meanwhile.80 
• Q successfully opposes A’s application to extend BLOBBY to boots.81  
• Q unsuccessfully negotiated with A for a licence to make boots like A’s.82 
• Q unsuccessfully negotiates with A to buy into its business.83  
Past tribunals in such cases have criticized Q’s conduct as bad faith, or for 
similar reasons have denied its registrability where the legislation did not 
explicitly make bad faith a ground of objection. The interesting question is: 
which, if any, of Q’s applications could today be rejected in Canada for bad faith 
without engaging in “ad hoc judicial moralism”? What of the two following 
variations on our A/Q case?: 
• A’s registration includes boots but A does not use BLOBBY for boots. Q 
starts using the mark for boots after having the registration for boots 
expunged by the TMO for A’s non-use. Is Q’s act any different from the 
example above where Q starts use after successfully opposing A’s 
extension of its refrigerator registration to include boots? 
• A puts BLOBBY on the shirts of a soccer team it sponsors. Q now applies to 
register BLOBBY for boots using the same Bodoni font in which A’s mark is 
registered and used. A UK tribunal found no bad faith although Q clearly 
 
80 Brown Shoe Co Inc’s Rectification App’n [1959] RPC 29, 33-4 (application rejected in court’s 
discretion).  
81 Re Vitamin Ltd’s TM App’n, [1956] RPC 1, 12-3 (Ch) (pharmaceuticals: discretion exercised to reject 
application in public interest). 
82 CARAMEL APPLE GRANNY (Trade Mark: Opposition) [2000] UKIntelP o12300, pp 20-1 (TMO) (claim to 
ownership of A’s mark not bona fide); similarly Taste of BC Fine Foods Ltd v Au-Yeung 2015 TMOB 
161 at [35]-[41], aff’d 2017 FC 299 at [43]-[4] (claim inappropriate). 
83 USA PRO, above note 75 at [21]-[3].  




intended to benefit from the association: A suffered no harm.84 Is harm to 
any entity necessary or does harm merely to the integrity of the 
trademark system suffice? 
Or what of a case where X runs a tourist attraction abroad as BLOBBY which 
is visited by many Canadians, where Y gets to know of X’s attraction, opens a 
similar one in Canada under the BLOBBY mark, and persuades some of X’s staff 
to join Y’s operation: may Y register BLOBBY in Canada? Such a registration was 
allowed before 2019 because the Act then did not allow the court to apply a 
“’rotten guy’ principle.”85 Given that the “rottenness” seemed to apply only to 
the applicant’s conduct in filing for registration rather than its general 
commercial morality, would such an application today be invalid as being filed 
in “bad faith”?86 
6. CONCLUSION 
Given the government’s decision to shift to a registration system where use 
may be postponed for 3 years or more after registration,87 the enactment of a 
bar banning bad faith applications was generally welcomed as somewhat of a 
relief. It is nevertheless regrettable that little, if any, consultation with 
interested parties preceded the bar’s introduction. Issues such as those raised 
 
84 BEKO (TM: Opposition) [2010] UKIntelP o30710 at [90] (App Person), obiter; cf Vibe Ventures LLC 
v 3681441 Canada Inc 2005 FC 1650 at [48]. 
85 Marineland Inc v Marine Wonderland & Animal Park Ltd (1974) 16 CPR (2d) 97, 104 (Fed TD).  
86 The words used in Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co v Singer (1996) 66 CPR (3d) 453, 482 (Fed TD), aff’d 
(1998) 79 CPR (3d) 45 (Fed CA), to characterize the conduct in Marineland, previous note. 
87 See Act, s. 53.2(1.1), not proclaimed at date of writing. Invalidation for abandonment before expiry 
of the 3-year period is nevertheless possible: see, e.g., Beijing Jingdong, above note 56 at [24] 
(invalidated 12 months after registration).    




in this Comment could then have been ventilated and clarified. Greater clarity 
will no doubt emerge over time as the Board and the courts start deciding cases, 
but some of the costs and inconvenience that this process will impose on the 
trademark system’s users could have been easily avoided with some 
forethought. 
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